SEP 14 1
CHARLES ELMORE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1951

No. 324

HORACE BAKER,

Petitioner,

vs.

ANDERSON HOTELS OF OKLAHOMA, INC., JAMES ANDERSON, NICK DOUVAS AND LORRAINE DOUVAS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

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ANDERSON HOTELS OF OKLAHOMA, INC., A CORPORATION; JAMES ANDERSON; NICK DOUVAS; AND LORRAINE DOUVAS,

Respondents

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT.

Petitioner Horace Baker prays certiorari to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit which reversed a personal injury judgment in his favor by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.

In reversing such judgment, petitioner asserts that:

I

The Court of Appeals decided a basic and highly important question of local law, viz., the force and effect of the current 1941 "Code and Revised Laws of Oklahoma", in

a way *directly in conflict with the repeated specific acts of the Legislature of Oklahoma,* and *the decisions respecting this Code by the highest appellate court of Oklahoma.*

II

The Court of Appeals declined to follow controlling decisions of the highest court of Oklahoma that the "Oklahoma Statutes 1941" is a reenactment of each of the laws therein and has thus cast doubt on the validity of every law contained in such "Code and Revised Laws" when such laws may become an issue in the Federal Courts.

III

In announcing a construction of the "Code and Revised Laws" of the State of Oklahoma contrary to that adopted by the highest court of Oklahoma, the Court of Appeals has directly invaded a fundamental right reserved to the respective states by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

IV

Directly contrary to the Oklahoma statutes and the decisions of Oklahoma's highest appellate court, when confronted with two Oklahoma laws passed in the *same session* of the legislature and effective the *same day,* the Federal Court of Appeals held *the one expressly repealed in 1915* to repeal in 1908 "by implication" the one carried forward in the Oklahoma Statutes of 1909, 1910, 1921, 1931, 1941, and in 1943 *re-enacted.*

Petitioner asserts that whether or not the Federal Courts are required to follow the decisions of the highest courts of the states as to the construction to be given to the re-enacted statutory law by the respective states is a question of

national importance, not heretofore specifically decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.

It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that this case falls clearly within Rule 38 (5) (b) as a case in which certiorari may be granted.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, which does not as yet appear in any published reports, appears in the record herewith presented at pages 58 to 62; the judgment of the United States District Court appears at R. 13 and 14, and the Order Overruling Motions for New Trials and to Set Aside Verdict of Jury and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict appears at R. 19 and 20.

Summary Statement of the Matter Involved

On the night of December 2, 1949, Horace Baker, petitioner, was trapped by fire in a room on the third floor of the four-story, delapidated and highly combustible Lorraine Hotel in Sapulpa, Oklahoma. In an effort to save himself from imminent death, since no rope was provided as required under such conditions by local law, Baker attempted to improvise one from a sheet and lower himself from the window to safety. The sheet was not a sufficient substitute. It ripped apart. Baker fell to the cement sidewalk below. He was seriously and painfully injured. For such injuries he brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma and recovered judgment.

The 1941 Oklahoma Statutes, Title 63, Section 172, reads:

> "Independent of and in addition to the external iron fire escapes that may be required by any law of this State . . ." a rope is to be placed in every room on the second and each higher story. (Full text, Appendix.)

That law was first passed by the Legislature of Oklahoma about the time the subject hotel was built. The law was passed in the exercise of its police power by the Oklahoma

Legislature to protect the public in precisely the situation Baker was in—a highly combustible building—a fire trap where a dozen metallic fire escapes which were not in the room where the guest was lodged would not help—and the height above the pavement so great that a rope and not a sheet would be required to escape.

The defendants, at the trial, recognized that a rope was required under the law and by evidence attempted to show that they had a rope in the room. The jury decided that the defendants had not so equipped their hotel, and that their failure so to do was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury (R. 11). The jury found Baker sustained damages in the amount of $11,000 (R. 13).

By Motion for New Trial and Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict the defendants thereafter contended that Section 172 of Title 63, of the 1941 Oklahoma Statutes, hereinabove quoted, requiring a rope escape to be placed in every room of hotels of this type, had been repealed "by implication" in 1908 (R. 15-19).

This contention was carefully briefed, and Judge Royce Savage, the trial judge, concluded that *any doubt* as to the present validity of the statutory section in question *was removed* by its 1943 re-enactment in the 1941 "Code and Revised Laws" of Oklahoma and two decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, *Atlas Life Insurance Company* v. *Rose,* February 19, 1946, re-hearing denied March 19, 1946, 196 Okl. 592, 166 Pac. 2d 1011, and *Ex Parte Haley,* October 11, 1949, 202 Okl. 101, 210 Pac. 2d 653, 12 ALR 2d 416-433, interpreting two acts of the Oklahoma Legislature, Title 75, Ch. 4, S. L. 1941, Secs. 1, 2, 7, and 8, and Title 75, Ch. 4, S. L. 1943, Sec. 1. (Full text in Appendix.)

Wholly disregarding these two acts of the Oklahoma Legislature or the decisions of the highest appellate court

of Oklahoma interpreting them, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the United States District Court.

To reach its conclusion the Court of Appeals ignored the controlling Oklahoma decisions concerning the 1943 re-enactment of each of the laws in the "Oklahoma Statutes 1941." It held a law, which had been *expressly repealed in 1915 and never thereafter carried forward,* had repealed *by implication in 1908,* a law *passed the same legislative session, effective the same day, carried forward in the Oklahoma statutes in 1909, 1910, 1921, 1931, 1941, and expressly re-enacted in 1943!*

The expressly repealed and thereafter omitted section provided *for external iron fire escapes.* Yet it was held to impliedly repeal the continued and re-enacted law, requiring rope escapes, by its terms, made specifically *"Independent of and in addition to the external iron fire escapes that may be required by any law of this state . . ."*

The expressly repealed and omitted section does not purport to cover four-story hotels, yet the Court of Appeals held this law irreconcilably repugnant to the continued and re-enacted law covering four-story hotels.

The chapter entitled "Public Health and Safety" appearing in the Revised Laws of Oklahoma, 1910, contained an article entitled "Fire Escapes" and another article entitled "Hotels." Each article contained sections providing for fire escapes in hotels. *These provisions were not inconsistent.* In 1915 the Legislature realized that the chapter concerning fire escapes specifically covered the whole subject matter. It, therefore, amended the "hotel article" and omitted from it the duplicating provision already contained in the "fire escape article" which, so far as rope fire escapes are concerned, remained unchanged from enactment to date. It was one of these expressly repealed sections of the "hotel article" which the Court of Appeals held to repeal

by implication the unchanged and subsequently re-enacted section of the "fire escape article."

In 1941 the Oklahoma Legislature passed an act (Title 75, Ch. 4, S. L. 1941, Secs. 1, 2, 7, and 8) providing for and authorizing the revision of the Code, authorizing and directing omission of all repealed laws, and providing that when such revision was approved *it would be and was adopted as the statutory laws of Oklahoma.* The commissioners designated by law to do the work proceeded as directed and their revision and codification of the laws was approved by the Justices of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma as the law of Oklahoma. The Legislature thereafter passed another law (Title 75, Ch. 4, S. L. 1943, Sec. 1) adopting the commissioners work as approved by the Supreme Court as the law of Oklahoma, and validating and making effective *each and every part thereof.*

Thereafter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in *Atlas Life Insurance Company* v. *Rose, supra,* and in *Ex Parte Haley, supra,* first set down the rule and then re-examined and confirmed the rule that the "Oklahoma Statutes 1941" was a complete re-enactment of each of these laws as distinguished from the two preceding compilations which were merely *prima facie* evidence of the law. These laws and decisions the Court of Appeals wholly ignored.

Basis of the Court's Jurisdiction

Patently, if the repeated express declarations of the Oklahoma Legislature and the highest appellate court of Oklahoma as to the effect of the exclusion of repealed laws, and the revision, codification, and re-enactment of the whole body of Oklahoma statutory law is to be ignored by the Federal Court of Appeals, a basic right reserved to the states by the Constitution and laws of the United States has been abrogated and doubt cast on the authenticity of every

law contained in the present 1941 Oklahoma "Code and Revised Laws", when an issue in the Federal Courts. An intolerable and confusing situation is thus created where, in the Oklahoma State Courts the 1941 Statutes are the law of Oklahoma, and in the Federal Courts of Oklahoma each section may or may not be the law.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States is invoked under Title 28 U. S. Code, Sec. 1254 (1) and under Supreme Court Rule 38, Paragraph 5 (b).

The judgment of the United States District Court was filed October 2, 1950, Order Overruling Motions for New Trials and to Set Aside Verdict of Jury and For Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict was filed December 22, 1950; the final opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, upon appeal timely prosecuted, was filed July 14, 1951, order entered denying petition for rehearing August 18, 1951, and on the 24th day of August, 1951, order entered staying mandate for a period of thirty days from August 18, 1951, pending filing of the instant proceedings.

Question Presented

Shall certiorari be granted where it is obvious that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has rendered a decision resulting in irreconciliable conflict between that Court and not only the express legislative mandate but also the highest appellate court of the State of Oklahoma respecting the binding force and effect of the current "Oklahoma Statutes 1941" and subsequent amendments thereto as the statutory law of Oklahoma?

Note: The reasons relied upon for the allowance of the writ are contained in the "Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit," *supra.*

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF CERTIORARI

Certiorari is sought to review an opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit not yet officially reported (R. 58), wherein the Court of Appeals reversed a judgment by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma of damages for personal injuries.

Certiorari should be granted because the Federal Court of Appeals has decided a fundamental and highly important question of local law directly contrary to the legislative mandate and decisions of the highest appellate court of the state, casting doubt upon the very factum of local laws, causing confusion and unequal protection under the law, and creating conflicts and increased litigation.

The United States Court of Appeals wholly disregards two acts of the Oklahoma Legislature and the decisions by the highest appellate court of Oklahoma interpreting these acts. Title 75, Ch. 4, S. L. 1941, Secs. 1, 2, 7, and 8, and Title 75, Ch. 4, S. L. 1943, Sec. 1 (Full text in Appendix.) *Atlas Life Insurance Company* v. *Rose,* February 19, 1946, rehearing denied March 19, 1946, 196 Okl. 592, 166 Pac. 2d 1011, and *Ex Parte Haley,* October 11, 1949, 202 Okl. 101, 210 Pac. 2d 653, 12 ALR 2d 416-433. These acts and decisions conclusively declare that the "Oklahoma Statutes 1941" and every law therein contained is the law of Oklahoma, *even if, before inclusion in said code, it had not been the law!*

> "We think it quite clear that upon the passage of the above act adopting the 1941 Code, and making the same of force as the Code and Revised Statutes of the State, such Code *and all the laws therein contained* thereafter became the law of the state, including 991, *supra, although such section may not have been in force and*

effect prior thereto." *Ex Parte Haley, supra,* page 655. (Italics supplied.)

The Court of Appeals opinion is directly contrary to Oklahoma law as recently declared expressly by the Oklahoma Legislature and the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

The Legislative Acts violated appear in Appendix, page 16.

Atlas Life Insurance Company v. *Rose, supra,* holds that inclusion in the Code and Revised Statutes of the State of Oklahoma known as "Oklahoma Statutes 1941" of a *penal* law which prior thereto had been declared *unconstitutional* by the Oklahoma Supreme Court by reason of a defective title, *validates the law and that the same is "now in full force and effect,"* page 1014.

Ex Parte Haley, supra, holds a law passed at an *invalid* referendum and hence *which had never been passed* by the legislature *prior to its inclusion in the Oklahoma Statutes, 1941,* by the 1943 Adoption Law (Title 75, Ch. 4, S. L. 1943, Sec. 1, 75 O. S. Supp., Sec. 114) was adopted and made of full force and effect; that the *legislative purpose* in adopting the 1941 statutes was to *"breathe into every provision in that code the vitality of a legislative enactment,"* page 656.

The foregoing enunciation of the Oklahoma law is particularly emphatic in view of the fact that it was set forth in a re-examination of the re-enactment rule originally set down in the *Atlas* case. Relative to the *Atlas* decision, in the *Haley* decision the court says at page 665:

> "Petitioner contends that the conclusion reached in that case is erroneous and in effect urges that the case to this extent should be overruled. This challenge impels us to re-examine the rule there announced."

At page 655 the court said:

> "... We see no reason for departing from the rule there announced."

These decisions are the latest expression of Oklahoma's highest court upon the subject, neither altered nor modified.

Instead of following this emphatic expression of Oklahoma law, the Court of Appeals decided that a law, which had been *expressly repealed in 1915 and never thereafter carried forward,* had repealed *"by implication" in 1908,* an act passed the same legislative session, effective *the same day,* carried forward in the Oklahoma Statutes in 1909, 1910, 1921, 1931, 1941, and expressly *re-enacted in 1943* and upon which judgment was rendered in the trial court! The Tenth Court of Appeals ignored wholly the legislative act by which the legislature in 1943 expressly adopted the 1941 Code or the law.

Certiorari should be granted to require the Federal Courts to respect and follow the re-enacted code of a state as the law of the state in conformity with the express legislative mandate and the decisions of the highest appellate court of the state.

So far as petitioner has been able to determine, this exact point has never been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.

There can be no dispute that since liability in the instant case is predicated upon the violation of a specific statute of Oklahoma, the case is one in which the state law is the controlling rule of decision. *Erie Railroad* v. *Tompkins,* 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 ALR 1487. *Huddleston* v. *Dwyer,* 322 U. S. 232, 64 S. Ct. 1015, 88 L. Ed. 1246.

The applicable general rule appears to be that stated in the *Erie* case, *supra,* at L. Ed. page 1194:

> "Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the states is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence."

In the instant case the Federal Court has *disregarded both the authority of the Oklahoma Legislature and of the highest appellate court of Oklahoma.*

Certiorari should be granted:

1. To require the Federal Court to recognize the proper sphere of authority of the state legislature and the state court;

2. To avoid unseemly conflict between state and Federal courts;

3. To avoid an additional burden of litigation;

4. To avoid making the local law uncertain and doubtful;

5. To assure litigants who may elect to sue or be sued in the Federal Federal Courts of equal protection under the law.

> "The proper function of a Federal Court, in a case governed by state law, is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to be." *Klaxton Co.* v. *Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,* 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477.

1. *The writ should be granted to require the Federal Court to recognize the authority of the Oklahoma Legislature and the Oklahoma Supreme Court to determine, as they have expressly determined, that the local statutes have been*

re-enacted both as a code and each and every law therein contained.

Under the decision complained of, the act of the legislature in expressly adopting as the law the 1941 statutes is wholly abortive. The legislature in effect is *deprived of the power to re-enact a code as the law.*

2. *The writ should be granted to avoid unseemly conflict between the state and Federal courts upon matters of state law—the state holding the statute in question as set forth in 1941 code to be the law, and the Federal Court holding such statute repealed in 1908!*

The sound public policy supporting this proposition cannot be assailed.

3. *The writ should be granted to avoid placing an additional burden of litigation upon the Federal Courts.*

The Legislature of Oklahoma instructed the revisers to omit repealed laws from the 1941 statutes of Oklahoma, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma as to "*compliance*" with these instructions. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma approved the revisers work as complying with instructions to omit all repealed laws. The Legislature thereafter adopted the work as the "Code and Revised Laws" of Oklahoma and breathed "into every provision in that code the vitality of a legislative enactment." *Ex Parte Haley, supra,* page 656. The Federal Court of Appeals now seeks to *do again, with a conflicting conclusion, what the Legislature, code revisers, and Supreme Court of Oklahoma have already done!* And by the decision in the instant case, the Court of Appeals in effect asserts a right to do so in any case arising under the Statutes of Oklahoma!

The decision will encourage litigation in the Federal Courts in Oklahoma by persons whose private interests may be served by circumventing some section in the 1941 Code as

re-enacted in 1943 by the Oklahoma legislature, for the *state and Federal court decisions* regarding the binding force and effect of any section therein *are in irreconcilable conflict.*

Clearly the "Circuit Court of Appeals has . . . decided an important question of local law in a way probably in conflict with applicable local decisions." Rule 38, Paragraph 5 (b).

In truth the conflict is patent, and the question important since it involves the binding force and effect of the whole body of current statutory law as set forth in the "Oklahoma Statutes 1941". *Erie Railroad* v. *Tompkins, supra.*

4. *The writ should be granted to avoid conflicts, doubt, and uncertainty respecting the status of the current volume of statutes in Oklahoma.*

Since the 1921 and 1931 Statutes of Oklahoma each had been merely *prima facie* evidence of the law, and confusion and highly technical and theoretical arguments concerning the validity of the laws therein resulted, it was determined that the revisers, Legislature, and Supreme Court do away with such doubts and uncertainties as to the Law of Oklahoma by adoption as the law of one carefully considered revision, codification, and re-enactment. In the conflicting decision complained of, the Federal Court of Appeals nullifies all that work entirely, casting doubt upon the authenticity of each law in such code and re-enactment when an issue in the Federal Courts.

5. *Certiorari should be granted to assure litigants, who may elect to sue or who may be sued in the Federal Courts, equal protection under the law.*

If the decision complained of is not set aside, a litigant in the Federal Court is bound by and subject to an uncodified and uncertain body of Oklahoma Statutes dating all the way back to Statehood. To determine the law, when what

is the Oklahoma law becomes material, he must resort to long inquiry through all previous legislative enactments. In the Federal Court he may not depend upon the 1941 Code and Revised Laws as adopted in 1943. If on the other hand, the same litigant sues or is sued in the state court, the 1941 Code as subsequently amended is the sole and exclusive authoritative statement of the law; all earlier enactments not therein set forth were expressly made of no binding force or effect, and all laws therein were expressly enacted as the law.

In the instant case, the state court protects the litigant by enforcing the law in question as intended and directed by Legislature; the Federal Court deprives him of that protection.

Conclusion

To preserve the constitutional rights of the states, to avoid unseemly conflict between state and Federal courts, to avoid placing an additional burden of litigation involving only local law upon the Federal Courts, to remove doubt and uncertainty as to what is the local law when an issue in Federal Courts, to afford non-residents equal protection under local law, and for the first time to decide a fundamental legal question of national importance, certiorari should be granted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

75 Oklahoma Statutes 1941, Secs. 101, 102, 107, 108; Title 75, Ch. 4, Session Laws of 1941

"*Section 1.* The West Publishing Company of St. Paul, Minnesota, is hereby authorized, empowered and directed to compile, codify and annotate the 'Oklahoma Statutes 1941', according to the following terms, specifications and conditions."

"*Section 2.* **Said Statutes** shall contain the Magna Carta, **Declaration of Independence**, the Constitution of the United States with its amendments, the Organic Act of Oklahoma, the Enabling Act of Oklahoma, the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma with its Schedule and amendments, *and all laws of the State of Oklahoma of a general and permanent nature now in force,* including all laws and amendments of a general and permanent nature passed by the Regular Session of the Eighteenth Legislature, 1941, with *all repealed laws and those held unconstitutional by the highest courts eliminated.*" (Italics supplied.)

"*Section 7.* Before finally printing said Statutes, the West Publishing Company shall present their manuscript of said Statutes to the Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma, and shall secure the *approval of the Justices of the Supreme Court* as to form and *as to compliance with the provisions of this Act;* provided, further, that the Justices of the Supreme Court shall also, after approving said manuscript, *certify said Statutes as to accuracy, completeness and correctness.*" (Italics supplied.)

"*Section 8.* The Oklahoma Statutes 1941, prepared by West Publishing Company, and in one (1) volume as above provided for, after the same shall have been approved by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma as hereinabove provided, shall, as provided in Section 9, *be, and are hereby, adopted as the general and public laws of the State of Oklahoma and the official Statutes of the State of Oklahoma, as to all laws therein contained . . .*" (Italics supplied.)

75 O.S. Supp. 1949, Sec. 114; Title 75, Ch. 4, Sessions Laws of 1943

"*Section 1.* That the Oklahoma Statutes 1941, compiled, codified and annotated and indexed under and by the provisions of House Bill No. 519 of the Eighteenth Legislature of the State of Oklahoma, approved May 9, 1941, Session Laws of 1941, pages 457 to 460, inclusive, and compiled, codified, and annotated under and by the supervision of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma and approved by them on December 31, 1941, and promulgated and published by C. C. Childers, Secretary of State, under proclamation dated the 27th day of January, 1942; said Oklahoma Statutes 1941, being further identified as one volume, containing pages 1 to 3589, inclusive, be and the same is hereby *adopted and made of force as the Code and Revised Statutes of the State of Oklahoma* to be known as 'Oklahoma Statutes 1941,' and *that all general laws of the State of Oklahoma not therein contained be and the same are hereby repealed . . .*" (Italics supplied.)

63 Okl. Stat. 1941, Sec. 172, Re-enacted by Title 75, Ch. 4, Session Laws, 1943, Sec. 1, Originally Enacted Session Laws, 1907-1908, Ch. 38, Sec. 2.

"*Section 2.* Independent of and in addition to the external iron fire escapes, that may be required by any law of this state, upon any hotel or large boarding house, tenement house, or in any building in which rooms or floors are let for numerous families, whenever any said building can accommodate twenty or more individuals, and is two or more stories in height, it shall be the duty of the owners of all said buildings to provide, and cause to be securely fixed inside to a bolt three fourths of an inch in diameter through the wall near the window head of at least one window in each and every room on the second floor, and each and every room on each higher floor, a rope made of good material not less than one half inch in thickness and of sufficient length to extend to the ground, or other place of landing; such rope escape in each room to be carefully coiled and kept near the sill of the window to which the escape is

attached, and with direction of manner of use attached thereto." Effective August 24, 1908.

Title to Original Enactment, Supra

"An Act

To provide certain buildings, public and private institutions, and places of public assemblage, and places of public resort, *hotels,* lodging apartment and other public houses, with fire escapes, and providing penalties for violation thereof." (Italics supplied.)

Session Laws, 1907-1908, Ch. 43, Sec. 4, Enacted Same Session, Effective Same Day, as Sec. 2, Ch. 38, Supra, Repealed by Session Laws, 1915, Ch. 227, Held by Federal Court of Appeals to Repeal the Foregoing Act "By Implication" in 1908.

"*Section 4.* Every hotel which is not over two stories in height and which is not provided with such fire escape as is described in section two hereof, shall be provided in every bedroom or sleeping apartment on the second floor, a manila, cotton or sisal rope at least five-eighths of an inch in diameter, and of sufficient length to reach the ground, with knots or loops not more than fifteen inches apart and of sufficient strength to sustain a weight and strain of a least five hundred pounds. Such rope shall be securely fastened to the joists or studding of the building as near the window as practicable, and shall be kept coiled in plain sight. Every such hotel shall provide and maintain, in a conspicuous place in every bedroom or sleeping apartment above the ground floor, a printed notice calling attention to such rope, and giving directions for its use." Effective August 24, 1908. Repeal effective June 21, 1915.

The Title to the 1907-1908 Act, Sec. 4, Supra:

"An Act

To provide for the inspection and management of hotels and public lodging houses, defining hotels, providing for fire escapes, and prescribing penalties."

The Title to the 1915 Amendtory Act Repealing the Foregoing Section Which Had Been Carried Forward as Ch. 67, Art. 6, of the Revised Laws of Oklahoma Annotated 1910:

"An act amending Chapter 67, Article 6, of the Revised Laws of Oklahoma Annotated 1910, being an act to provide for the inspection, regulation and management of and defining rooming houses, hotels, restaurants, apartment houses and prescribing penalties therefor."